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1 Introduction 
China’s impressive development since the introduction of market-oriented reforms in the late 
1970s has had a considerable impact on the world economy. After a first decade and a half of 
cautious experiments with liberalization, markets, and internationalization, Chinese reforms 
accelerated in the early 1990s and the Chinese economy started growing at a rate that has not 
been matched by any other country. The GDP growth rate has averaged nearly 10 percent per 
year since that time. China has become the world’s largest exporter and one of the largest 
importers, with a huge domestic market driven both by export-oriented industry and nearly 
1.4 billion increasingly affluent domestic consumers. It is one of the main destinations for 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and has also become an important outward investor. The 
emergence of this new economic superpower has created both opportunities and challenges 
for other countries. The purpose of this paper is to focus on some of the challenges and to 
discuss three imbalances that put pressure on the relationship between the EU and China. 
These concern the large deficit in Europe’s trade with China, the unequal conditions for 
European investment in China and Chinese investment in Europe, and the EU’s inability to 
agree on a common China policy.  
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Before turning to these challenges, it appropriate to acknowledge some of the achievements 
and results of China’s economic miracle. China’s rapid growth has mainly benefited its own 
population. Average per capita incomes in the mid-1980s were around USD 300, comparable 
to those in India. By 2014, China had a GDP per capita of nearly USD 7,000, while the average 
Indian was struggling to reach a quarter of that. Chinese incomes are not equally distributed 
across the population, but growth has still lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese out of 
poverty. As a result, the UN’s first millennium development goal—to reduce the share of the 
global population in extreme poverty by half between 1990 and 2015—was reached already in 
2010. China’s growth has also benefited other economies. By combining cheap domestic 
labour with capital and technology from other countries (using the foreign direct investment of 
multinational enterprises as an instrument), China has built the world’s largest manufacturing 
sector. In many industries, Chinese manufacturing is also the world’s most competitive. 
Foreign companies that have invested in China have reduced their production costs, and many 
have also managed to improve their profitability, despite the ever tougher competition in the 
global market. Consumers have benefited from the growing supply of cheap products “made in 
China”, including traditional labour-intensive commodities such as shoes and garments, as well 
as cell phones, computers, and other high-tech products. The rapid productivity increases seen 
in the Chinese manufacturing sector have helped keep global consumer prices low. At the 
same time, producers of raw materials and of industrial commodities have derived benefit 
from China’s expansion in the form of higher export prices. This has been of particular 
importance for many developing countries, which have managed to reach respectable growth 
rates thanks to export demand and direct investment from China. As a result, China is not only 
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the dominant economy in Asia; it has also become Africa’s largest trade partner and foreign 
investor, as well as an important actor in Latin America. 
At the same time, it is obvious that China’s growth has put pressure on many other countries. 
China’s share of the world economy has doubled every 8 years since the early 1990s. In 1992, 
China accounted for 2 percent of world GDP; at the turn of the millennium it had a share of 4 
percent; by 2008 it had reached 8 percent; and in 2014 its share is estimated at about 14 
percent. If nothing surprising happens, China will reach 16 percent of the global economy in 
2016 (at official exchange rates). China’s share of world exports has increased correspondingly, 
to about 13 percent in 2014. Its share of world imports has also grown; however, import 
growth has fallen short of export growth during the past decade. Large trade surpluses have 
become a notable characteristic of the Chinese economy since the turn of the millennium. 
The result is that many mature industrial economies have lost export shares to China, and 
been forced to introduce painful structural adjustment processes. Goods that used to be 
produced at home are now imported from China, while domestic production and exports have 
been redirected towards industries where China’s competitive advantages are weaker. Most of 
the mature OECD economies have tried to shift towards high-tech industries and knowledge-
intensive services.  
However, many countries have struggled to find new goods and services to replace their 
traditional export goods. The trade balance of many of China’s trade partners has 
deteriorated, with large deficits outside China reflecting the large Chinese trade surplus. Large 
and persistent trade deficits may hinder economic development. Domestic firms may be 
forced out of business by tough import competition, resulting in a loss of jobs and tax revenue; 
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the financial sector may be hit by non-performing loans as the earnings of domestic firms fall; 
and debts to foreign creditors may grow out of control when a country’s export revenues fall 
short of its import bill. It is not surprising that large trade and current account deficits often 
lead to financial crisis.  
The US, where the global financial crisis started in 2007–2008, has suffered from larger trade 
imbalances than most other countries. The US debate on the causes of the financial crisis has 
also been quite intense, often with part of the blame ascribed to China. The trade deficit—and 
hence part of the responsibility for the financial crisis—has been blamed on an undervalued 
Chinese currency, which boosts Chinese exports at the same time as it makes foreign goods 
more expensive in China. China has also been blamed for protecting its market with various 
non-tariff barriers. There is further criticism against China’s high savings and investment rates, 
which are thought to reduce current consumption and to raise export capacity. Commentators 
have suggested that China has blocked some of the adjustment mechanisms that would 
normally contribute to a balancing of the US deficits. One such mechanism operates through a 
depreciation of the deficit country’s currency. A weaker US dollar should result in cheaper US 
exports and in a corresponding increase in the dollar price of US imports. By fixing the 
renminbi to the US dollar (until 2005), and then allowing only limited appreciation, China—or 
so the accusation goes—has blocked this adjustment mechanism. Another adjustment process 
is linked to interest rate adjustments in the deficit country. A trade deficit is expected to result 
in higher interest rates, because money is flowing out of the economy to finance imports. 
These higher interest rates should lead in turn to higher savings and lower consumption and 
investment, as well as lower imports. Here, China is criticized for its willingness to finance the 
US current account deficit by investing its own trade surpluses in the American financial 
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market. The inflow of Chinese funds arguably contributed to keeping interest rates low before 
the financial crisis, despite efforts by the Federal Reserve to raise short-term interest rates by 
absorbing liquidity from the market. 
The competition from Chinese exports has been a challenge also for the EU. In 2008, the EU’s 
bilateral trade deficit with China amounted to USD 240 billion, nearly matching the American 
deficit with China that year (USD 268 billion). Since then, the Union has managed to reduce the 
bilateral deficit, while the US-China imbalance has grown further. By 2013, the European 
deficit had fallen below USD 200 billion, while the American deficit had risen to USD 319 
billion. But the EU remains vulnerable (both directly and indirectly) to the imbalances caused 
by Chinese trade surpluses, due to the impact Chinese trade can have on other countries.  
The first theme to be discussed in this paper concerns China’s export competitiveness, which 
has contributed strongly to the country’s fantastic economic growth, but which has also 
caused worrisome trade deficits in other parts of the world. In particular, I focus on the 
reasons for the Chinese export miracle, and on the EU’s prospects for managing the 
imbalances that follow from China’s trade surpluses.  
The second area has to do with an imbalance that potentially is just as serious as the trade 
deficit, but which has not received as much attention yet: the asymmetry between the 
treatment of foreign investors in the European and Chinese markets, respectively. FDI is 
already a key strategy for European firms trying to reach Chinese consumers, and its 
importance can be expected to increase in the future. However, many European investors in 
China meet a market environment where they feel disadvantaged, and where state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) are favoured by various rules and regulations. At the same time, Chinese 
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firms have begun to expand abroad, and China (including Hong Kong) is now the second largest 
foreign direct investor in the world, after the US. Chinese FDI in Europe is on the rise, and 
Chinese investors have almost unlimited access to the EU’s single market.  
The third imbalance concerns the Union’s inability to act as an equal counterpart in 
negotiations with the Chinese government. Different EU member states have different 
interests in relation to China. As a result, the EU has no common China policy. This 
fragmentation has also made it possible for China to maximize its bargaining power, by 
focusing on bilateral relations with selected member countries. (Such an approach yields 
greater bargaining power than does entering into a strategic partnership with the EU as a 
whole.) The main challenge for the EU is to bridge the interests of its member states in such a 
way as to make it possible for it to act in a consistent and coordinated manner, thus making 
good results in negotiations with China possible. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 focuses on the first imbalance and looks at the 
reasons for China’s export miracle, with some emphasis on the role of the state. It suggests 
that China’s “unnaturally” or “unfairly” strong export competitiveness has already begun to 
diminish. Section 3 discusses the second imbalance, which relates to the business environment 
and competitive conditions in the Chinese market, and points to several areas where extensive 
government intervention distorts competition and discriminates against foreign companies. 
One conclusion from this discussion is that it will be difficult for the EU to bring about change, 
particularly in industries that China defines as strategic growth industries. Section 4 looks at 
imbalances within the EU, and considers the challenges Europe faces in formulating a common 
China policy. Section 5 summarizes my findings, and suggests that a transatlantic trade and 
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investment partnership may offer the best prospects for reconciling the interests of different 
EU member states and strengthening the Union’s negotiating position vis-à-vis China. 
2 International trade: the Chinese export miracle  
Since the early 1980s, China has gradually assumed a more and more prominent position in 
the world economy. From being an inward-looking and basically self-sufficient economy until 
the late 1970s, China has proceeded in the last few years to become the world’s second largest 
economy after the US, the largest exporter, and one of the top destinations for foreign direct 
investment. Exports have been the main driver of Chinese development, and the export share 
of GDP rose to a peak of almost 40 percent in 2006–2007. Since then GDP growth has been 
faster than export growth, and the export ratio has fallen to 30 percent. Given the size of the 
economy, it can still be argued that this is a remarkably high degree of internationalization, 
inasmuch as large countries tend to have lower export ratios. In India the export to GDP ratio 
is around 20 percent, in Japan it is 15 percent, and in the US it is about 14 percent. In other 
words, China has largely based its growth on foreign rather than domestic demand. This 
export-led development strategy has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty; 
incomes have risen from 300 dollars per capita in 1980 to 6,800 dollars per capita in 2013. As 
Figure 8.1 makes clear, growth in incomes and growth in exports have been correlated over 
time: growth in the former has been faster when growth in the latter has been faster.  
Figure 8.1:  Exports and per capita incomes in China 1980–2013. 
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Source: UNCTAD Statistics. 
 
There is no doubt that various policy reforms have contributed greatly to the creation of the 
Chinese export miracle. The abandonment of the command economy, the de-collectivization 
of agriculture, and the various other steps taken to liberalize and decentralize the economy are 
so fundamental that they hardly need to be mentioned. At the same time, there are several 
other major reforms that have shaped the specific export-oriented model that China 
represents. The transition from plan to market began in the early 1980s, in the coastal regions 
of southern China, where a number of cities (and eventually provinces) were allowed to 
experiment with markets, commerce, and internationalization. The assumption behind these 
geographically defined experiments was that exports would be the engine of the economy—
there was simply not enough domestic purchasing power to drive development, since a 
stagnant command economy remained operative in most of the country for another decade. 
Another engine of growth was foreign direct investment. China had neither the capital nor the 
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commercial technology to conquer the world market. Allowing FDI attracted both of these 
resources to China. The experiments also led to large differences in regional development. 
Growth in the coastal regions was much faster than in the rest of the country: a “dual” 
economy emerged. While coastal towns grew richer and more modern, central and western 
China remained much poorer and less developed.  
The next major steps in the reform process were taken around 1992. Deng Xiaoping, one of 
the Communist Party’s most prominent leaders, made a famous inspection tour of the special 
economic zones in southern China that year, in order to assess the results of the market-
oriented reforms. Deng’s conclusions are often summarized with the slogan: “It doesn’t matter 
whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice”. (In other words, there is no 
fundamental contradiction between the market economy and China’s particular form of 
socialism.) In the ensuing debate on the direction to be taken by China’s economy in the 
future, Deng’s pragmatic reformist ideas prevailed, as against more cautious conservative and 
ideological conceptions. The regional experiments were extended to the national level. At the 
same time, inflows of foreign direct investment began to rise rapidly. A large devaluation in 
1994 reinforced the country’s export competitiveness and guaranteed the success and survival 
of the export-led growth model, in an environment where liberalization and decentralization 
were expected to contribute to significant inflation. With a cheaper renminbi, export prices in 
foreign currencies remained relatively low despite domestic inflation, and the opportunity to 
earn increasingly valuable dollars gave individual firms a strong incentive to continue focusing 
on exports rather than on domestic sales. 
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Economic growth in the inner and western parts of China, however, was slow at first. Since the 
coastal regions had built up a big lead over the previous decade, they were much more 
attractive as locations for new investment. They had better infrastructure and a larger supply 
of skilled labour, and their local authorities had learned to operate in a market economy. As 
Figure 8.2 shows, the coastal provinces remained remarkably dominant in 2006, accounting for 
a disproportionate share of exports, investment, and GDP. 
The subsequent stage in the country’s economic transformation came in the early 2010s, in 
the form of WTO membership. The clear message conveyed through China’s accession to the 
WTO was that Chinese exporters would now have a more predictable export environment: in 
most cases, they could expect relatively free access to the major export markets.  There had 
been some uncertainty earlier about access to foreign markets, because the multilateral rules 
on market access and equal treatment only apply to trade among WTO members. As we saw in 
Figure 8.1, China’s export growth accelerated at this time, and its trade and current account 
surpluses started to rise quickly. (Before the turn of the millennium, by contrast, China had 
rarely recorded large trade or current account surpluses.) 
Figure 8.2:  Distribution of GDP, FDI, exports, and population across regions, 2006. 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics. 
 
2.1 Demography and geography 
Market reform, liberalization, foreign direct investment, currency devaluations, and WTO 
membership are some of the building blocks of the Chinese export miracle. In addition, there 
are geographic and demographic reasons for China’s competitiveness. These are to some 
extent related to the specific export-led development strategy chosen by the Chinese 
leadership. I noted above that this policy resulted in large geographic fissures in the country’s 
development, with a dual economy and a large lead for coastal areas. While the coast was 
industrialized and urbanized, the hinterland remained largely agricultural. This duality 
contributed greatly to the ability of coastal export-oriented industries to maintain their 
international competitiveness over time. Although both total employment and labour 
productivity in manufacturing have increased significantly, wages in labour-intensive export 
industries remained relatively low for many years. A large pool of cheap labour was available, 
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in the form of low-paid and often underemployed people from central and western China, who 
were willing to take manual jobs in the coastal provinces. Even low wages were enough to 
entice them to move from their home province, because the alternative—staying at home and 
subsisting on yet lower incomes from small-scale farming—was even less attractive. Estimates 
on the number of domestic migrants or “floating workers” vary, but even conservative 
estimates suggest that at least 190 million people were working outside their home province in 
2005. The absence of independent trade unions has also helped to keep wage levels low. The 
existing unions are controlled by the Communist Party, and unsurprisingly they have chosen 
not to threaten China’s export competitiveness by demanding wage increases that match or 
exceed increases in labour productivity.  
The one-child policy has given further impetus to the export strategy. This policy is important 
because it has contributed to a low dependency ratio: that is, a low percentage of the 
population that is not of working age. As Figure 8.3 shows, only just over a third of the Chinese 
population is too young or too old to participate in the workforce. This is one of the lowest 
figures among the 214 countries covered by the World Bank statistics database: only the UAE 
and Qatar record clearly lower dependency ratios, while Singapore and Hong Kong are at 
around the same level as China. A demographic structure of this type gives poor countries an 
excellent opportunity to generate economic growth and development. A low dependency ratio 
means that only a small part of aggregate income need be set aside to support children and 
the elderly. This leaves a lot of room for saving and investment, thereby raising the economy’s 
productive capacity. Moreover, a large part of this capacity gets focused almost automatically 
on exports, because a high savings rate, by definition, means that domestic consumer demand 
is low. 
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Figure 8.3: Dependency ratio, China 1960–2013. Elderly (above 64 years) and 
children (below 15 years) as a share of the working age population 
(15–64 years) (%) 
 
 
Source: World Bank Databank. 
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tuition fees are expected. Health care has been commercialized, and few procedures are 
completed without extra payments to doctors and nurses. The poorly developed pension 
system forces people to save for their old age. In addition, the one-child policy means that 
elderly persons cannot rely much on support from their children. In recent years, finally, rising 
housing prices and stiff requirements for down-payment have added a strong motivation for 
high household saving.  
Yet, the passion of Chinese households for saving does not explain more than perhaps half of 
China’s total savings. One thing that distinguishes China from most other countries is that the 
corporate sector and the government in that country also exhibit a very high propensity to 
save. China’s remarkably low wage levels are a major reason for this. Due to the combination 
of a large underemployed labour pool with a lack of independent trade unions, capital owners 
have been able to capture a large share of the labour productivity gains generated in industry. 
Wages simply have not grown as fast as labour productivity has. Despite fierce competition in 
the Chinese market, the capital share of China’s value added (and GDP) increased steadily for 
over 20 years, from the late 1980s to about 2010. By the latter date the capital share had risen 
to two-thirds, at the same time as the wage share had fallen to one-third. By way of 
comparison, many mature market economies have recorded wage shares of around 65 
percent of GDP during the past decade. Although some of the capital share of value added is 
ultimately used for consumption (since some households own productive capital), the larger 
part of returns on capital has been used for new investment. State enterprises have rarely had 
to pay profit shares to their owner; instead they have been allowed to reinvest their profits. 
Small and medium-sized private enterprises have also been forced to finance much of their 
growth from reinvested earnings, since Chinese banks have preferred to lend to SOEs and to 
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large private corporations with good political connections. These reinvested earnings 
represent corporate savings (and thus are recorded as both saving and investment in the 
national accounts). Where public finances are concerned, it bears noting that the low level of 
public spending on social welfare means that a large percentage of the state budget is 
available for investment, mainly in infrastructure. This high level of tax-financed public 
investment also registers in the national accounts as a high public savings rate. 
Yao Yang, a leading economist at Peking University, has accordingly described the Chinese 
growth model as a virtuous cycle, wherein successful export constantly creates new 
competitiveness. The initial export success leads to profits, which are reinvested in new 
machinery and technology that make the workforce more productive. Then, since wages do 
not rise as rapidly as productivity does (and since the renminbi has not been allowed to 
appreciate significantly), the result is rising competitiveness, exports, and profits. This in turn 
yields resources for new investment, which leads to further labour productivity gains, and so 
on. As a result, Chinese industry is favoured both by low labour costs (due to the large supply 
of cheap labour with little bargaining power) and low capital costs (because there are plenty of 
reinvested profits that are cheaper than borrowed capital). The main imbalance in the Chinese 
economic system, from an international perspective, is therefore not the undervalued 
currency, but rather the artificially low wage share of GDP. Given the rapid economic progress 
seen in China, workers in that country have been grossly underpaid during the last decade. 
2.2 The road to balanced trade relations 
A more flexible Chinese exchange rate (read: a more expensive RMB) would probably help 
reduce China’s export surplus, but long-term solutions to global trade imbalances cannot be 
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sought in the area of exchange rate policy. Instead, balancing requires that China allow the 
wage share of GDP to rise; thereby boosting domestic consumer demand and reducing 
exports. Without an increase in domestic consumption in China, it is possible that an 
appreciation of the currency will be offset by a continued gap between rapidly increasing 
labour productivity and slower wage growth. The experience of Japan’s endaka period, which 
began in the mid-1980s, is a cautionary tale that contributes to China’s reluctance to use its 
currency as a balancing instrument. Japan’s current account surplus grew rapidly during the 
first half of the 1980s, with a corresponding increase in the US deficit. Intense international 
pressure led to the so-called Plaza Agreement of 1986, whereupon Japan allowed the yen to 
appreciate. In one year, the value of the yen increased from 240 yen per dollar to 130. Yet, the 
US deficit did not disappear. One reason for this was that Japanese exporters managed to raise 
domestic labour productivity, so that their export competitiveness was maintained. Moreover, 
Japanese firms began to outsource labour-intensive production to China and Southeast Asia. 
Yet, the deficit in the US domestic savings-investment balance was not reduced: private 
consumption and investment remained high. This underlines the need for adaptation in 
European and American domestic accounts today as well. Higher public and private saving in 
the West is needed to bring down our deficits. 
What can or should the EU do to nudge China towards an equilibrium with a higher wage 
share, higher domestic consumption and imports, and a reduced emphasis on export-led 
growth? The answer is probably that the EU does not need to do anything at all—the 
adjustment process is already underway. Chinese leaders have been forced in recent years to 
rethink the export-driven growth model for several reasons. Global trade imbalances are one 
reason. China already has a large surplus in most of its trade relations with OECD countries, 
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and it will not be easy for the EU or the US to absorb even more Chinese goods and services—
at least not at the same rate as during the past decade. There is still scope for increasing 
exports to emerging markets and developing countries, but these export markets are 
significantly smaller than those in the rich OECD nations (although their growth rates are often 
considerably higher). Exports will simply not be able to deliver long-term growth rates at the 
levels China is aiming at. 
A further reason for reassessing the country’s growth strategy is that the distorted distribution 
of value added has created inequalities and social imbalances. China’s Gini coefficient, which 
measures the degree of inequality in income distribution, has reached nearly 0.50 in recent 
years. This is higher than the level in most of Africa, and comparable to that in countries like 
Mexico and Argentina. The nations of the Nordic region, which are among the world’s most 
equal, have Gini coefficients of about 0.25. The growing inequality in China reflects not just the 
fact that a large share of productivity gains accrue to owners of capital; it also registers the 
widening gulf between urban and rural areas. Likewise, the gap between high-skilled and low-
skilled workers has grown greater over time. There is justified concern that large income 
differences can lead to corruption and crime, as well as to a deeper dissatisfaction with society 
that may eventually become a threat to the country’s political stability. For example, labour 
relations in many industries and provinces are tense, and strikes and labour disputes of various 
kinds are common.1 There are significant pressures for higher wages and better working 
                                                          
1 A political threat that often appears in connection with labour disputes concerns the position 
of trade unions. The official trade unions are tightly controlled by the party and are rarely 
involved actively in disputes, except when such disputes concern foreign companies or when 
they underscore official Chinese policy (e.g., strikes at Japanese subsidiaries in periods when 
China and Japan are at odds over territorial or other matters). When unexpected and 
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conditions. The rapid public response to a widely reported wave of suicides at Foxconn’s 
Shenzen factory in southern China in 2010 (which was probably caused in part by low wages 
and poor working conditions) shows that these concerns are taken seriously by the Chinese 
authorities. Shortly after these events, minimum wages for Foxconn workers were raised by 30 
percent. Regional authorities in Shenzhen and other parts of China soon followed suit with 
similar wage increases. On average, minimum wages have risen by more than 20 percent per 
year since 2010, halting a 20-year decline in the wage-to-GDP ratio.  
The 12th Five-Year Plan, which covers the 2011–2016 period, highlights several of the reforms 
that are necessary to change the character of the Chinese economy. Domestic demand will be 
increased, and consumption rather than investment will drive the economy. For this to 
happen, the wage share of GDP will have to be raised. However, while the plan states an 
ambition to raise minimum wages, it says nothing about how an increase in the wage share is 
to be achieved. This may be because market forces have already triggered the necessary 
adjustment process.  
Two ongoing processes are currently influencing labour supply and wages in Chinese industry. 
The first one concerns the excess supply of labour in the countryside, which has provided the 
pool of migrant labour that has kept manufacturing wages relatively low. Analyses of the rural 
sector show there is not much surplus labour left, and that the marginal productivity of labour 
is rising (Cai 2010 ; Zhu and Cai 2012). This suggests China has reached the stage of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
unplanned strikes and labour disputes occur, there is always a risk that workers will 
spontaneously choose their own representatives—an obvious threat to the Communist Party’s 
dominance and monopoly on political power that cannot be tolerated. When such events 
occur, therefore, the problem is often resolved quickly, either through intervention by the 
police or military or through assent to the workers’ demands by the employer.  
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development called the “Lewis turning point”, where marginal incomes in agriculture and 
manufacturing have been more or less equalized, and the manufacturing sector can only 
attract additional workers by offering higher and higher wages. The more people that leave 
agriculture after this turning point, the higher the reservation wage for those who remain. 
With fewer workers in farming, moreover, there is an increase in the amount of agricultural 
land per remaining worker, which results in higher labour productivity and incomes. 
The second process relates to demographics and the one-child policy. In recent decades, the 
declining dependency ratio reflected a reality where the great majority of the population 
belonged to the labour force and competed for jobs. Now, however, the one-child policy is 
beginning to affect the dependency ratio in the opposite direction. The largest age cohorts are 
made up of people born before the restrictions on the number of children were introduced in 
the early 1970s; today, these cohorts are already over 40 years old. The median age in China 
today is about 36—not far from the 37 in the US and Northern Europe’s 40, but a long way 
from the 25 found in many developing countries. According to the United Nations Population 
Fund, the median age in China will increase to around 42 before 2030, which will be similar to 
the figure in Northern Europe and well above the 40 projected for the US. It is also likely that 
50- and 60-year-olds in China will not be as productive as their counterparts in Europe and the 
US. Far from all of them will be able, after a life of hard work in an unhealthy working 
environment, to keep working until they reach the formal retirement age (60 for men and 
between 50 and 55 for women). Moreover, since population growth rates in recent decades 
have been low, few young people are entering the labour force. More and more young people 
today are also able to get a tertiary education, delaying their entry into the labour market. The 
number of workers available to China’s manufacturing machine is no longer increasing; 
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instead, labour is becoming a scarce resource. The rapid wage growth registered in recent 
years reflects this reality. As a result, China’s edge in export competitiveness will be reduced. 
Under the title “The End of Cheap China”, Rein (2012) describes some of the changes that are 
necessary due to rising wage costs. Some labour-intensive firms are moving from China to 
countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, where wage costs are a fraction of 
those in China. Other companies survive by relocating to the country’s interior, where costs 
are still lower than in the developed coastal regions. Many companies also handle the cost 
increases by raising labour productivity: higher educational levels, modern infrastructure, and 
relatively low costs for mechanization and automation give great scope for increased 
efficiency. Most of the foreign companies being squeezed by higher labour costs are shifting 
some of their production in China from exports to domestic sales. This entails new challenges. 
As long as their intended market was outside China, foreign companies could often avoid 
problems connected with local competition. With a stronger focus on the domestic market, 
such issues become more important. 
3 Direct investment and multinational enterprises:  
the changing role of China  
Foreign direct investment played an important role already in the early 1980s, during the first 
Chinese reform experiments. Foreign entrepreneurs furnished many resources which were 
lacking in China’s command economy: financial capital, technology, and knowledge of foreign 
markets. In addition to the jobs and tax revenues created by these foreign investors, important 
benefits for the Chinese economy were thought to result from knowledge flows between 
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foreign and domestic companies (the latter included joint venture partners, suppliers, and 
customers of foreign multinationals). Some of the knowledge possessed by foreign firms would 
“spill over” to domestic companies and contribute to their growth and internationalization. 
The foreign firms were generally not seen as direct competitors to local businesses, but rather 
as a complement to them. Direct investment was focused on exports, and the world market 
was believed to be big enough to absorb the exports of both multinationals and local 
companies. The domestic market was less attractive to foreign investors, because incomes and 
purchasing power were still low. The Chinese government encouraged inflows of FDI with tax 
benefits, public investment in infrastructure, and the allocation of land and factory buildings. 
Inflows of FDI were still relatively small in the 1980s, because China was an unknown and 
uncertain market. Growth took off, however, when market-oriented reforms were confirmed 
following Deng Xiaoping’s coastal inspection tour in 1992. Then, as Figure 8.4 below shows, 
there was another phase of strong FDI growth in connection with China’s WTO entry in 2001. 
This expansion has made China (together with Hong Kong) the world’s largest recipient of FDI 
in recent years. EU companies have accounted for about one-fifth of capital inflows to China. 
China provides offshoring opportunities, but the latest wave of investment is also driven by the 
growing market within the country. As Chinese wages rise and the RMB slowly becomes 
stronger, a heavier focus on the local market becomes rational even for investors that 
originally saw export as their primary goal. 
Figure 8.4: Annual FDI inflows to China, Hong Kong, and the USA 1980–2013 
(million USD) 
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Source: UNCTAD Statistics. 
 
For a long time, there was a large imbalance between growing inflows of FDI to China and very 
limited outflows of investment from that country. This imbalance was not surprising, given 
China’s low levels of income and development. To become multinational, companies do not 
just require capital; they also need some proprietary assets, which enable them to survive in 
foreign markets where established local firms have an advantage, due to their superior 
knowledge of local market conditions. Developing proprietary assets (e.g., brands and 
technical innovations) takes time. John Dunning’s well-known Investment Development Path 
model shows how countries can be expected to have large net inflows of FDI when incomes 
and labour costs are relatively low, and how outflows of FDI tend to increase as incomes and 
development levels rise. In the typical pattern suggested by Dunning, it is not until a country 
reaches middle-income status—with a per capita income of 10–15,000 US dollars per year—
that investment outflows begin to increase significantly (Dunning et al 2008). 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
0
M
ilj
ar
d
e
r 
U
SD
 
China and Hong Kong
China
USA
 23 
The Chinese pattern, however, has been different. Figure 8.5 shows that FDI outflows from 
China began to grow rapidly around 2003—outflows of FDI from Hong Kong had started ten 
years earlier—and that China and Hong Kong together already had a relatively balanced 
investment position at that time.
2
 In 2013, they jointly registered FDI inflows of just over 200 
billion US dollars, while their outflows came to over 190 billion US dollars. China has thus 
become an important foreign investor over the course of the last decade. What is remarkable 
is that this internationalization began at a much lower income level than in other countries. In 
2003, average per capita income in China had not yet reached 2,000 US dollars, and it is still (in 
2014) below 7,500 US dollars. 
One reason for China’s deviation from the “normal” investment development path is to be 
found in its pronounced regional differences. The country’s low average income level does not 
reflect the prosperity achieved in the most advanced parts of the country. In Beijing and in 
coastal cities like Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Wenzhou, Hangzhou, Suzhou, and Shanghai, per 
capita incomes are more than twice as high as the national average (as well as clearly higher 
than per capita incomes in the countries which have joined the EU since 2004). Another and 
possibly yet more important reason for China’s deviation is that its government has defined 
internationalization as an important strategic goal for the country’s development. The state 
has therefore provided various kinds of support to help the largest companies gain access to 
                                                          
2 It should be noted there is a debate about so-called “round-tripping”, whereby Chinese firms 
move capital to Hong Kong and then re-invest it in China, in order to get some of the various 
benefits designed to attract FDI to the economy. The same problem applies to some extent to 
Chinese investment in the Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, and other tax havens. There is 
not enough information to assess how serious the resulting distortion in the data is, but it is 
clear that round-tripping leads official statistics to overstate FDI outflows. At the same time, it 
is likely there are other investment outflows which are underreported. Aggregate statistics on 
China’s FDI outflows should thus be treated with some caution. 
 24 
foreign markets. The most important measures are related to financing, but the Chinese 
authorities have also given valuable political support to companies, as well as investment 
guarantees. This has been particularly important in developing countries, where China’s 
overseas investment is integrated with aid and diplomatic relations. 
Figure 8.5:  Annual outflows of FDI from China, Hong Kong, and the USA 1980–
2013 (million USD) 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD Statistics. 
 
Initially, the aim of this strategy—known under the slogan “Go Global”—was to secure raw 
materials for the Chinese economy. As a result, most of China’s outward FDI has gone to 
projects in oil and gas, mining, forestry, agriculture, and other commodities in developing 
countries of Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Data for 2007 show that only 3.8 percent of the 
total value of Chinese FDI went to Europe, and Chinese investment accounted for less than one 
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percent of the aggregate inflow of FDI to the EU. North America accounted for just 2.8 percent 
of the total.  
Chinese investment in Europe has increased since then, as other motives than access to raw 
materials have become more important: in 2011 and 2012, Europe’s share of China’s outward 
FDI rose to nearly 10 percent. The US share of China’s overseas investment was about 5 
percent.
3
 Table 8.1 shows the top ten European recipients of Chinese FDI since the turn of the 
millennium.  
Table 8.1:  Chinese FDI in the EU 2000–2011, ten main destinations (million USD 
and number of projects)  
 
 Cumulative value 
(million USD) 
Total number 
of projects 
Number of 
acquisitions 
France 5 722 70 24 
UK 3 684 95 26 
Germany 2 543 146 33 
Sweden 2 251 20 6 
                                                          
3 It is difficult to get accurate information on China’s overseas investment; statistics from 
different sources often vary widely. In particular, it is hard to identify final destinations for 
China’s outward FDI. For example, Nicolas (2009) notes that, according to official statistics, 
nearly 80 percent of China’s foreign direct investment in 2007 went to Hong Kong, the British 
Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands. Only rarely, of course, are such tax havens the final 
destination for these capital flows; but existing statistics do not reveal where the investment 
ends up. 
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Hungary 2 065 18 4 
Netherlands 1 164 47 15 
Belgium 847 15 3 
Greece 714 5 0 
Italy 554 47 16 
Austria 391 11 5 
Source: Ernst & Young (2012) 
 
Some of the new motives for outward FDI are macroeconomic. The global financial crisis that 
started in 2008 demonstrated the riskiness of China’s strategy of primarily investing its current 
account surpluses in US Treasury bonds. Furthermore, investing in real assets in developed 
countries both is relatively safe and offers greater returns than does investing in government 
bonds. Hence, an increasing share of the current account surplus is used to fund FDI. There are 
also at least three additional new motives for internationalizing Chinese industry: (1) outward 
FDI, it is believed, will contribute to China’s development by creating markets for Chinese 
products; (2) it will help Chinese companies access foreign research and technology; and (3) it 
will enhance the competitiveness of Chinese companies in the home market. Acquiring 
Western companies with established market shares, brand names, and R&D resources can be a 
convenient way to meet all three objectives. Geely’s purchase of Volvo Cars is a good example 
of this, as is Lenovo’s purchase of IBM’s personal computers branch. Other Chinese companies 
too have succeeded, in growing numbers, in establishing their own brands, and they are now 
aiming to conquer market shares in Europe, North America, and Japan. Examples of such 
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Chinese brands are Haier (white goods), Huawei (telecom), and ZTE (cell phones). It is not 
difficult to foresee that, in years to come, the West will make the acquaintance of many other 
Chinese brands also. 
The need to strengthen the competitiveness of domestic firms in the home market is related, 
both directly and indirectly, to China’s accession to the WTO. WTO membership resulted not 
only in the impressive export boom that started around the turn of the millennium; it also 
opened the Chinese market to foreign competition. An important part of this increase in 
foreign competition comes about as a consequence of international trade: as a WTO member, 
China has committed itself to reducing tariff barriers and to applying fair and transparent trade 
regulations. However, the boom in inward FDI that followed China’s WTO accession has 
probably been even more important. The world’s leading companies are not only trying to 
export to China from their home countries; they are also present in the Chinese market 
through their FDI ventures. When these foreign investors redirect an increasing share of their 
production from exports to domestic sales, Chinese companies will struggle to maintain their 
market position. The Chinese government has obviously taken note of this challenge. While 
export-oriented foreign companies that came to China before the global financial crisis were 
welcomed, it is already clear that existing foreign investors that are currently shifting their 
focus towards the domestic market will not always be treated equally well. The same goes for 
new investors heading to China to compete with local companies. 
This has led to the next great imbalance in relations between the EU and China. While the 
investment imbalance a decade ago mainly had to do with the volume of investment—a lot 
from the EU to China, almost nothing the other way—the new imbalance has much more to do 
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with investment conditions and competition. The European market is relatively deregulated, 
and Chinese investors can usually expect the same treatment as local companies. In the 
Chinese market, however, the converse does not apply. Foreign investors face extensive 
regulation and cannot expect equal treatment. Discrimination against foreign firms occurs not 
only in the case of so-called “infant industries”, where local companies are so small and 
underdeveloped that they cannot be expected to cope with competition from foreign 
multinationals. It is also found in the case of strategic industries, where Chinese companies 
have already become multinational and have invested in Europe and other developed markets. 
Figure 8.6 shows the OECD’s index of investment restrictions in China, the EU, and some other 
selected economies in 2013. The index gives a weighted measure of different types of 
investment rules and restrictions: limits on foreign ownership, licensing mechanisms, rules for 
foreign staff, and various other limitations and requirements in 22 sectors per country for the 
OECD and the G20. The index value ranges from 1 (completely closed to foreign investors) to 0 
(fully open). With a value of 0.42, China has the most regulated and restrictive policy 
environment of all 58 countries included in the index.  
Figure 8.6:  OECD regulatory restrictiveness index 2013, selected countries 
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Source:OECD Regulatory Restrictiveness Index, http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm 
 
Among emerging markets, India and Russia also apply extensive restrictions, while Brazil and 
South Africa have a somewhat more liberal environment. Among the rich countries, New 
Zealand, Canada, and Iceland exhibit the most restrictive FDI environments. Generally 
speaking, the EU countries are among the most open, with an average index value below 0.04. 
The only non-European countries with figures comparable to or lower than the EU average are 
Argentina and Colombia. 
3.1 Chinese investment in Europe 
The European Chamber of Commerce in China has recently examined the conditions for 
Chinese direct investment in Europe. Its analysis confirms the image of the EU as a region with 
relatively few administrative barriers to incoming FDI (European Chamber 2013a). One of the 
few obstacles reported by Chinese investors concerns EU competition law, which requires all 
major mergers and acquisitions to be investigated by the relevant competition authorities. This 
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requirement also applies, however, to transactions of this kind among European companies. 
Overall, Chinese investors rate the European investment environment as more liberal than 
that in the US or Australia, where arguments relating to national security have been used more 
frequently to block Chinese projects. 
However, the relatively low formal entry barriers for FDI should not be interpreted as a 
guarantee for a painless investment process. A large proportion of Chinese investors report 
difficulties and obstacles in connection with regular everyday operations. In particular, there 
are complaints about cumbersome labour regulations, tax and accounting rules, and rules for 
visas and work permits. Except where visas and work permits are concerned, these challenges 
are not unique to Chinese investors: they apply as well to new local businesses and to EU firms 
investing outside their home country. Investing in market-specific knowledge is necessary in 
order to adapt to any new business environment. Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect such 
regulatory obstacles to decline in importance over time, as Chinese investors learn to operate 
in the EU market. Many Chinese investors also report problems arising from negative 
perceptions, among European consumers, of Chinese companies and Chinese product quality. 
These problems too are likely to diminish over time, as European consumers grow more 
accustomed to Chinese brand names. 
It should be noted in this connection that one reason for the negative perceptions in Europe 
(and the US) is that a large part of Chinese investments is made by SOEs. SOEs account for over 
70 percent of Chinese investment value in Europe, and the Chinese state is also involved in 
much private Chinese investment. In most developing countries, where the bulk of Chinese FDI 
is in energy and raw materials, SOEs are even more dominant. Foreign investors face some 
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degree of scepticism in most economies, and the distrust is even greater in the case of foreign 
investors which are state-owned, because it is not always clear what the foreign state aims to 
achieve over the long term. Private owners tend to behave in a predictable manner, with profit 
maximization as their chief objective; but a state may have other strategic motives that make 
it hard to predict its decisions and priorities. Nor is it just the Chinese state that faces 
suspicions of this kind. Volvo’s failed merger with Renault in 1993 illustrates the general 
character of the problem. One of the decisive Swedish arguments against the merger plan was 
the fact that Renault was a state-owned French company, which could be expected for the 
most part to favour French rather than Swedish interests. The acquisition of Volvo six years 
later by Ford, a private company, did not provoke as fierce a debate. However, the acquisition 
of Volvo in 2010 by the Chinese company Geely led to a renewed discussion about ownership 
and national priorities. Among other things, the case illustrated the difficulty of categorizing 
the ownership characteristics of large Chinese corporations today. Geely is formally a private 
company, but its acquisition of Volvo was supported by the central Chinese government, and 
local authorities in Shanghai and Daqing are listed as major shareholders of Geely. The distrust 
of China’s government as a foreign investor is not likely to disappear for the foreseeable 
future—not as long, at any rate, as it chooses to manage the Chinese economy with 
instruments and objectives that are unfamiliar to observers in Western market economies. 
3.2 European investment in China 
There is a clear contrast between the regulatory environment for Chinese companies in the EU 
and that for EU companies in China. Alongside its analysis of Chinese investment in the EU, the 
European Chamber of Commerce in China carried out a detailed study of the conditions for EU 
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investment in China. The study describes an environment where government intervention and 
state ownership of productive resources systematically distort competition and discriminate 
against foreign investors, particularly in industries and sectors which the Chinese government 
sees as having a strategic value (European Chamber 2013b). Since the onset of the global 
financial crisis in 2008, regulations have gotten tighter in several areas. Moreover, the large 
Chinese stimulus package launched in response to the crisis was primarily aimed at SOEs, and 
it reinforced their dominant position in the market. 
Market access is one of the main problems for foreign investors in China. The Chinese 
authorities restrict FDI in several sectors and require joint ventures with Chinese investors in 
many others (often limiting foreign owners to a minority stake). The conditions for new foreign 
investment projects are listed in a regularly published and highly detailed catalogue—the 
Foreign Investment Catalogue—which covers hundreds of industries and products. For 
example, the Catalogue for 2012 prohibited FDI in postal services, energy, media, the defence 
industry, and parts of the mining industry. In the automotive industry, foreign owners were 
not allowed to own more than 50 percent of a joint venture, and foreign ownership limits in 
the financial sector were even stricter. The total foreign ownership share in a Chinese bank 
could not exceed 25 percent, with a maximum of 20 percent for any individual foreign 
investor. FDI was also restricted in such industries as hotels, real estate, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, construction equipment, certain food products, and 
transportation and communication. In addition, licensing requirements were imposed on 
travel agencies, construction companies, and suppliers of oil products. Often the rules for 
licensing are designed in such a way as to benefit local SOEs. Indeed in some industries, like oil, 
it is incumbent SOEs that administer licenses and quotas for new entrants. 
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Foreign investors that have already entered the market face a difficult environment too. In 
particular, they perceive the rules for government procurement as a major problem. The total 
value of new Chinese government procurement contracts comes to nearly 20 percent of GDP. 
Foreign companies, however, are rarely involved in this area, other than as partners of or 
subcontractors to the SOEs that are awarded most contracts. For example, the framework for 
the procurement of cars by government agencies identifies 412 vehicle models that are 
allowed as company cars. All of these models are produced by domestic companies; not even 
the foreign brands and models which are made in China qualify for the list. In conjunction with 
its accession to the WTO, China undertook to sign the international Agreement on 
Government Procurement, which establishes basic requirements for transparency and 
competition. 13 years later, however, China has yet to sign the Agreement. 
Another area where foreign companies face notable problems is in innovation and R&D. In 
China, the state has a leading role both in identifying and funding new products and 
technologies, and in creating markets for innovations. The government lists priority areas for 
innovation in detailed catalogues, which set out the industries and products it wishes to 
promote. These catalogues affect the allocation of resources for R&D and investment, at both 
central and local (provincial) levels. The latest catalogue (Guiding Catalogue of Key Products 
and Services in Strategic Emerging Industries, published in March 2013) lists more than 3,000 
products and services in seven strategic sectors where China hopes to become a world leader. 
To some extent, especially when domestic enterprises lack the necessary technologies and 
skills, these are also the sectors where China welcomes new FDI.  
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Table 8.2 below identifies the seven strategic emerging industries. To stimulate the 
development of local capacity, the government provides resources in the form of R&D funding 
and investment and production subsidies. The government also gives subsidies to consumers, 
and uses public procurement as an instrument to create markets for new products. Foreign 
companies are rarely included in such government-supported innovation processes. 
Kokko and Liu (2011) describe the state-led innovation system for the electric car sector, which 
the Chinese government has classified as one of the core strategic industries. To be eligible for 
government subsidies and R&D funding, the cars must be produced in China under a Chinese 
brand. For a brand to be registered, the applicant must share its key technology with the 
Chinese authorities, which obviously limits the incentives for non-Chinese companies to 
participate in the programme. Foreign companies taking part in publicly funded R&D 
programmes in China are also constrained by rules that confer the formal ownership of 
research results on the Chinese partner or financier. Further challenges for foreign companies 
arise from Chinese product regulations and product standards. These commonly differ from 
international standards, being based instead on solutions developed by leading local (state-
owned) companies. Other complaints relate to the lack of protection for intellectual property 
rights, such as trademarks and patents. Applicable legislation has improved and converged on 
international standards, but implementation is still inadequate, and foreign investors do not 
have much confidence in the capacity of the judiciary to protect their rights. 
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Table 8.2:  Strategic and emerging industries in China (with examples of 
products/services) 
 
1. New energy vehicles  Electric cars 
   Battery charging equipment 
   Hydrogen-powered vehicles 
2. Energy efficient and environmental technologies  Energy-saving technologies  
  Advanced environmental technology 
   Recycling 
3. Next generation information technology Information networks 
  Advanced electronics 
  Advanced software and IT services 
4. Biotechnology Biopharmacology 
   Biomedical technology 
   Genetic modification 
5. High-end equipment manufacturing Aviation industry / components 
   Satellites and applications 
   High speed trains / components 
   Marine equipment 
6. New energy Nuclear power 
    Wind power 
    Solar power 
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   Bioenergy 
7. New materials Functional materials  
   Nanomaterials 
   High-performance composites 
Source: “12th Five-Year Plan on National Strategic Emerging Industries”, State Council, Beijing, 
July 2012.  
 
One result of the strong incentives and subsidies in the priority industries is that production 
capacity can grow very rapidly when innovations reach the market. Subsidized local 
enterprises—mostly SOEs—tend to expand without much regard for market demand, and the 
rapid increase in supply may reduce market prices to a level that few profit-maximizing 
companies can handle. The trend in the wind power industry is a good illustration of this 
process. By about 2008, more than 100 Chinese manufacturers of wind turbines had entered 
the national market—the great majority of them owned by various local government 
authorities—and prices had fallen to a level that in effect forced large multinational companies 
like Vestas to leave the Chinese market (Liu and Kokko 2010). Few of the Chinese producers 
covered their costs, but local governments were willing to finance the losses because the 
central government continued to stress the strategic importance of the wind power sector. 
The total production capacity of China’s wind power industry in 2013 was estimated to be 
twice as large as domestic demand. The situation in the solar energy industry is similar; the 
Chinese overcapacity in solar panels has also spilled over into the global market. The European 
response has been to impose anti-dumping duties on the import of Chinese solar panels. The 
long-term equilibrium in China obviously cannot be a situation with many local producers and 
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continued overcapacity. Instead, it is likely the government will be forced to implement a 
comprehensive consolidation process, whereby the most efficient local companies will be 
supported and encouraged to grow through mergers and acquisitions. Such a process has 
already begun in the automotive industry. The government’s vision for that sector is that only 
a dozen of the more than 100 local brands will survive in the long term, but that these dozen 
will all operate on such a large scale that they will be able to compete with the established 
giants in the world market. 
More generally, it can be said that the competitive environment for foreign companies in 
China varies greatly, depending on the strategic importance of the sector and the strength of 
Chinese companies within it. Foreign firms that are primarily focused on exporting from China 
and which operate in traditional labour-intensive sectors meet a market-based environment 
for the most part, where the main challenges relate to changes in the Chinese macro economy. 
In these sectors, higher labour costs, competition for skilled labour, and concerns about an 
appreciating renminbi pose bigger threats than does government intervention. In non-strategic 
industries, market conditions may remain favourable even when the focus is on the domestic 
market. An example is elder care, where China’s needs are growing rapidly but strong 
domestic companies are lacking. In the retail sector, many foreign companies have been 
successful—Walmart, Metro, IKEA, Inditex, and H&M are well-known examples—even if the 
scope for expansion varies, depending on the product line, the local government setting, and 
the degree of domestic competition.  
High-tech companies in industries where China has long-term ambitions, but not yet much 
domestic capacity, are welcomed—but they will face major demands for technology transfer. 
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In some cases, they will be forced into partnerships with local businesses, and the lack of 
protection for intellectual property rights will probably become a problem for many of them. 
Without comprehensive reform of Chinese industrial policy, many of these companies will 
likely face unequal competition, because emerging Chinese competitors will benefit from 
public subsidies and other privileges. The development of China’s automobile industry is to 
some extent an example of this. Foreign manufacturers such as Volkswagen, GM, Citroen, and 
Ford began establishing production in China in the late 1980s, at a time when there was almost 
no local competition. They were forced into joint ventures with local companies. Over time, 
these local companies developed their production capacity and increased their market share. 
Foreign car brands still dominate the Chinese market, but domestic brands have grown rapidly, 
and today they account for nearly a third of all sales. In 2013, China’s auto market was the 
largest in the world, with total sales of over 17 million cars. In some sectors, however, 
domestic Chinese capacity remains weak, and strong foreign companies are likely to continue 
for a long time to dominate the market. Environmental technology is one such area. 
Foreign companies in strategically important industries where China has existing production 
capacity already face unequal competition. In some cases, this takes the form of outright 
restrictions on entry; in others, local firms enjoy various privileges relating to research, 
investment, production, and >><procurement—and foreign firms with hard budget constraints 
find it difficult to survive. As a result, in industries like wind, solar energy, and electric cars, 
local companies have come to dominate the market. In other sectors, such as 
telecommunications and information technology, foreign companies like Ericsson face a 
shrinking market share. It is not in the interest of the central government to force strong 
foreign players to leave the Chinese market completely, because they play an important role in 
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introducing new foreign technology and in disciplining the leading state enterprises (by serving 
as “benchmarks”). However, the Chinese government does have an incentive to restrict 
foreign market shares, so as to ensure that “national champions” reach a large enough scale to 
become competitive outside China as well. 
3.3 The road to more balanced investment conditions 
There is an extensive debate in Europe about how conditions for foreign investors in China and 
in the EU can be harmonized. As a representative for European companies, the European 
Chamber of Commerce in China has presented a number of proposals for action which, in 
principle, call for fundamental reform of the Chinese economy (European Chamber 2013b). In 
particular, the Chamber of Commerce points to the need for fundamental change in the role of 
government. Its proposals entail abandoning the investment-driven growth model, liberalizing 
the financial system, and forcing state enterprises to operate on a level playing field with 
private companies (both Chinese and foreign). At the same time, the state’s role should be 
reinforced in other areas. For example, its ability to control the economy through transparent 
and fair rules—rather than through distorting and discriminatory direct interventions—needs 
to be enhanced. Chinese innovation policy should be reformed. In lieu of a nationalist 
innovation policy based on discrimination in government procurement and founded on 
domestic technology standards, catalogues of priority sectors, and mandatory technology 
transfer requirements, the Chamber of Commerce calls for transparency, equal treatment, and 
a market-driven approach—in which the state defines the objectives, but leaves their 
implementation to the business community. In particular, barriers to entry for foreign 
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investors must be reduced. The Chamber also notes, very cautiously, that a continued 
imbalance may make it more difficult for Chinese companies to internationalize in the future. 
The cautious warning about possible consequences for Chinese companies operating outside 
China suggests an alternative approach to addressing the imbalance. It is not realistic to think 
China is prepared, at least in the short term, to give up its state-controlled economic model 
because the EU or other international actors put polite demands for fairer investment 
conditions. More direct and distinct pressure may be required. As long as European investors 
are subject to discrimination in China, perhaps Chinese investors should not benefit from free 
access to the European market. Reciprocity rather than imbalance could perhaps be a keyword 
for relations between the EU and China. Reciprocity would mean access to public procurement 
in China, reduced barriers to entry to the Chinese market, and stronger protection of the 
intangible assets that European companies bring to China. Exponents of this somewhat 
tougher line are mainly to be found in Brussels—in the European Commission and other 
European institutions.  
However, several of the EU’s member states prefer to present a softer image in their bilateral 
discussions with China. This fragmentation among European stakeholders—which stands in 
stark contrast to the powerful central government in Beijing, which claims a mandate to 
represent the whole nation—constitutes a further imbalance in the relationship between 
China and the EU. I will briefly discuss this issue in the next section. First, however, it may be 
appropriate to reflect on what arguments and instruments Europe can use to demand 
reciprocity. The answer, from a European perspective, is somewhat dispiriting. The imbalance 
in volumes of bilateral FDI is still so large that the Union cannot expect to get much by putting 
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pressure on Chinese investors in Europe. Bilateral trade volumes, by contrast, are much larger 
and more important to China, but the prospects for getting the more free trade-oriented EU 
members to accept the threat of protectionism as a negotiating strategy are not great. One 
instrument that will still be available for some time stems from the negotiations over Chinese 
membership in the WTO. Existing members were given the right to consider China a non-
market economy for a period of 15 years, until 2016. This makes it easier to impose anti-
dumping duties on Chinese exports if they are judged to distort competition in the receiving 
economy. Many of China’s trading partners—especially among developing countries—have 
formally declared that they now regard China as a market economy, but neither the EU nor the 
US has taken this step. This leaves some limited room for negotiation, and perhaps even a 
carrot, to try to convince China of the value of meeting some of the Union’s demands. That 
China’s status as a non-market economy is of some importance is demonstrated by the fact 
that China is the most frequent target of EU anti-dumping duties and safeguards. 
Yet, even if various pressures result in a reduction of explicit discrimination in the Chinese 
market and in fewer formal barriers to entry, it will be difficult to improve conditions for many 
European companies. The main reason for this is that SOEs dominate most of the sectors 
where China has strategic interests. Contacts between the state and SOEs are so close that it is 
difficult to imagine neutral and transparent processes for public procurement. Brødsgaard 
(2012) describes how leaders of the largest SOEs are appointed by the party, and how they 
circulate among leadership positions in business, government, and the party. This creates 
exclusive networks that prevent fair tender processes. In addition, SOEs control a very large 
part of the business-to-business market. When a state-owned company procures inputs or 
capital goods—whether it be aircraft, telecommunications systems, power plants, or mining 
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equipment—it enters into commercial negotiations with potential sellers. It is difficult and 
perhaps even impossible to regulate how commercial negotiations are conducted or what 
kinds of requirements buyers impose on potential sellers. Interviews with representatives of 
European companies suggest that requirements for local content, technology transfer, specific 
domestic standards, and the like are already common in such discussions, although in many 
cases the requirements have been removed from China’s explicit industrial policy and trade 
policy framework. 
The issue of “private standards” is not specific to China, and so far China’s SOEs have not had 
much reason to develop such principles. In some areas, in fact, the EU has progressed much 
further on this front. In the European food industry, for instance, most major wholesalers work 
with several standards that go beyond the sanitary and phytosanitary requirements specified 
in the Union’s multilateral trade agreements (Carlson and Johansson 2013). Foreign companies 
would find it very hard to compete in the Chinese market if dominant groups of SOEs were to 
develop private standards based on local (political) preferences. 
It would appear, in sum, that the opportunities to influence Chinese policy-makers are small. It 
is not realistic to think European pressure can induce China to abandon its state-run 
development model, so as to create a level playing field for public and private firms and for 
domestic and foreign companies. Some changes in formal regulatory systems can perhaps be 
negotiated, but it is unlikely such changes will have any major impact in many of the 
strategically important sectors, as long as the special status of SOEs persists. Moreover, to 
achieve any results at all from negotiations, Europe will need to agree on a common China 
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policy, and there is no such agreement at present. What else can the EU possibly do in order to 
deal with the imbalance in investment conditions? 
Aside from a strategy that combines the European Chamber’s cautious but persistent criticism 
of distortions in the Chinese business environment with the EU Commission’s stricter 
requirements for reciprocity and its occasional resort to anti-dumping duties, there are at least 
two additional approaches that could contribute to a slow improvement in this area. One 
option would be to align more closely with American China policy, which has essentially the 
same economic objectives as EU policy. The US is stronger than the EU in that it can speak with 
one voice; but it is also weaker, because its economic imbalances with China are larger and its 
economy is more dependent on capital inflows from China. A focused effort to align more 
closely with the US—e.g., through the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership that is 
currently being negotiated—could change the nature of the game, and to some extent shift 
the centre of gravity of the global economy from East Asia and the Pacific back to the North 
Atlantic. A scenario of this kind would give China a stronger incentive to secure its access to 
the huge North Atlantic market, which in turn would strengthen Europe’s bargaining position. I 
shall return to this scenario in the next section. 
An alternative but untested strategy would be for European business to act in a more 
coordinated way to put pressure on China. Private standards in the food sector relate mainly 
to health, safety, and the environment. There are also discussions about including operational 
practices, ethical issues, and labour conditions in these standards. Although requirements of 
this kind are difficult to justify from an efficiency and free trade perspective, it is likely they 
would have some impact on producers that are focused on exporting to the EU. Private 
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standards, it must be stressed, are not necessarily limited to the food industry, or to matters 
related to health, safety, or the environment. Most large European companies that have 
invested in the Chinese market also operate in Europe. They are important customers for 
Chinese exporters and investors, and they may exert influence through their commercial 
decisions. Achieving a high level of coordination of European industry vis-à-vis Chinese SOEs is 
probably impossible; however, if the costs of discrimination in the Chinese market become 
large enough, there should be some scope to develop joint “private” standards, at least in 
some sectors (e.g., telecoms or energy). This will be particularly relevant if the Chinese trend 
towards national standards that favour domestic companies accelerates. It will also be plainly 
pertinent if the Chinese government cements its practice of replacing formal policy 
interventions in trade and industry with informal requirements conveyed in commercial 
negotiations between SOEs and their foreign suppliers. Perhaps it is only by engaging industry 
and consumers in similar actions that Europe can push through demands for reciprocity. 
4 A common European China policy 
In the area of policy-making, the main imbalance between the EU and China lies in the 
fragmentation of the former. Instead of a common voice and a strong bargaining position 
based on the fact that Europe is the largest market for Chinese exports, division reigns on the 
EU side: 28 different countries, each with a weak voice and a small market. The interests of the 
individual countries differ, and the views of the European Commission rarely represent the 
average of the national sentiments. Given China’s growing importance over the past decade as 
an export market and investment destination, many of the member countries are reluctant to 
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put pressure on China. Strong criticism of China’s lack of democracy, human rights, and 
political opposition is shunned, in order to avoid negative repercussions in the economic area. 
In addition, China’s bargaining position has been strengthened by the European financial crisis, 
which has led some member states to turn to China for investment and financial support. 
However, before the financial crisis sharpened the contrast between northern and southern 
Europe, there were signs the Union was moving towards a slightly firmer China policy. In their 
analysis of European attitudes towards China, Fox and Godement (2009) identified four groups 
of countries with slightly differing perceptions in political and economic terms. On the political 
dimension, the authors distinguished between countries that were more critical of the Chinese 
social system and those that were less. On the economic dimension, they focused mainly on 
the readiness of different countries to use trade policy instruments to influence China. They 
classified Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK as “Ideological free-traders”. 
Countries in this category were often critical of China’s lack of democracy and human rights, 
and they were prepared to take up sensitive political topics in the bilateral dialogue with 
China. They were reluctant, however, to use trade policy as a lever to pry open the Chinese 
market. By contrast, “Assertive industrialists” (Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic) were 
also critical of Chinese policy, but willing to use protectionist measures to achieve economic 
goals. Belgium, Ireland, Austria, Luxembourg, and the Baltic states were “European followers”. 
These countries were similar to the “Ideological free-traders”, but they had only limited 
economic links with China and they were inclined to take a neutral political attitude towards 
that country. They were perceived as the most willing to follow a common EU policy. 
“Accommodating mercantilists”, the largest group, included almost all of the southern and 
eastern member states of the Union. Many of these countries were willing to use trade 
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barriers to protect their own markets, but they did not perceive any need for a political 
confrontation with China. They preferred a more accommodating political attitude, in order to 
facilitate economic interchange with China—even in cases where the Commission decided that 
it was necessary to protect European industry with anti-dumping duties or other interventions. 
France fell outside these groups. According to Fox and Godement (2009), France was a highly 
typical “Accommodating mercantilist” under Chirac until 2007. The authors were unable, 
however, to categorize Sarkozy’s government, due to its unpredictable blend of political 
support for China with tough criticism of that country for its lack of democracy, the situation in 
Tibet, and so on. 
Despite these differences of opinion, there were signs of some degree of increasing 
coordination of EU China policy during the 2005–2010 period. At the political level, the EU 
seemed to be prepared to put more pressure on China. European criticism of the human rights 
situation in that country became more vocal when Sarkozy chose to meet with the Dalai Lama 
during France’s EU presidency in 2008, and when the EU refused to abolish the arms embargo 
that had been imposed after the Tiananmen Square events (despite repeated Chinese 
demands to that effect in 2005–2008). The Union also took a tougher stance in the economic 
area. As China’s economy expanded and Chinese companies grew increasingly competitive, the 
economic imbalance—in terms of both trade and unequal conditions for FDI—seemed less and 
less acceptable. The Commission’s demands for reciprocity and equal treatment grew 
stronger, and a clearer connection was made between the EU’s need for better access to 
China’s market and a possible decision on its part to award market economy status to that 
country. 
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The Union’s tougher stance in turn affected Chinese attitudes towards cooperation with 
Europe. Before the global financial crisis, China was concerned that its dependence on Europe 
was (or at any rate appeared to be) greater than Europe’s dependence on it. The EU had a big 
deficit in its bilateral trade account with China, but its global deficit was not large. The Union’s 
tougher attitude put China in a difficult position. Instead of playing with large stakes and 
aiming at a comprehensive strategic partnership with the EU—with the compromises and 
concessions that such would require—China chose a combination of two other strategies. On 
the one hand, it emphasized its relationship with the United States. A G2 arrangement suited 
China, because its negotiating position under such conditions was strong. Granted, the US 
deficit was larger than the European one, and that could have led to tough demands for import 
restrictions from the American side; however, the US was also dependent on China to finance 
its deficits. The US also had much more FDI in China than Europe did, adding to China’s 
bargaining power. The US-China relationship too has required compromises—the appreciation 
of the RMB in recent years is to some extent a result of US pressure—but the outcome has 
been easier to predict. 
On the other hand, China’s relationship with the EU shifted towards bilateral contacts. China 
signalled its reaction to the tougher EU position already at an early stage, as when it cancelled 
a planned China-EU summit after Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in 2008, and after 
European criticism of the lack of human rights in China. Already before that time, in fact, China 
had begun to shift its focus from contacts with the EU institutions towards deeper relations 
with individual EU countries. One reason for this, most probably, was that China had 
concluded it would be more appropriate to treat the EU as a confederation than as a 
federation—at any rate for the foreseeable future. The financial crisis that hit the EU in 2008 
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confirmed this strategy, since—as we shall see below—it created a demand for precisely the 
type of bilateral relations that China was interested in.  
Godement and Parello-Plesner (2011) note that China has built up its bilateral relations with 
countries in Africa by entering on a broad front, with investments in transport infrastructure, 
manufacturing, logistics, and retail trade, coupled with investment and trade credits and 
diplomatic initiatives. This has benefited China’s African partner countries by creating 
opportunities for growth, but it has also given China a good strategic position that allows it to 
benefit from and to control future development. Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, 
China has started applying a similar strategy in its bilateral relations with countries in southern 
and eastern Europe, promising FDI as well as financial support to several of the EU members 
struggling with deficits in government budgets and in current accounts. Hence, in and around 
2010, southern and eastern Europe attracted 40 percent of the inflow of Chinese FDI into the 
EU, which is a disproportionately large share considering the size of the economies in question. 
China was also reported to have bought government bonds from countries such as Greece, 
Cyprus, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland. There are no official statistics on Chinese bond purchases, 
however, and it is hard to assess the significance of these actions. 
Meanwhile, China has also tried to establish special relationships with some of the EU 
members that have been more critical towards China. Its relationship with Germany has been 
particularly important. There are several reasons for China to seek closer cooperation with 
Germany. Not only does the latter country have Europe’s strongest economy; its dominance 
has also grown, as a consequence of the financial crisis. There are also important 
complementarities between the two countries: Germany needs the Chinese market for its 
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export industry, while China needs German technology for its industrial development. It is 
therefore not surprising that the Chinese market has become more important for German 
industry. Growing exports to China have helped dampen the impact of the financial crisis on 
Germany. China is already the largest export market for the automotive and manufacturing 
industries in that country, and it is an important destination for German direct investment (DB 
Research 2013). On the political front, China has upgraded its relationship with Germany to a 
strategic partnership. This includes annual consultations between the heads of government, 
which have taken place even when summits between the EU and China have been cancelled 
because of increased political tensions. As a result, German leaders have toned down their 
political criticism of China, and focused instead on economic cooperation. The German motto 
“Wandel durch Handel” (development through trade) reflects the expectation that trade and 
economic interchange will promote social transformation (Kundnani and Parello-Plesner 2012). 
Having Germany as a strategic partner is of great value to China—and not just where relations 
with the EU are concerned, but in a larger context as well. The discussions that took place in 
lead-up to the G20 Summit in 2010 were an illustration of this. It was proposed that no country 
(read: China) should be allowed to have a current account surplus in excess of 4 percent of 
GDP. Both China and Germany protested sharply, and the proposal was put aside. It should be 
noted that Germany’s current account surplus (as a share of GDP) has been notably higher 
than China’s in recent years—at around 6 percent, as against China’s surplus of 2–4 percent. 
More remarkably still, Germany’s surplus in US dollars was of the same magnitude as China’s 
in 2011 and 2012. 
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China’s changing attitude towards the EU has resulted both in a clearer division of labour 
between the EU institutions and the individual member states, and in a polarization among the 
latter regarding attitudes towards China. China’s growing economic weight means that few 
member countries think they can afford to take a strong ideological stance vis-à-vis that 
country. Most prefer a more conciliatory approach, in order to avoid losing Chinese 
investment and loans. The responsibility for taking a more critical line is therefore transferred 
to the EU institutions. Where member states’ attitudes are concerned, Godement and Parello-
Plesner (2011) argue that the four country categories identified by Fox and Godement (2009) 
have now collapsed into two main groups. The political dimension by which the countries are 
classified (the degree of criticism of China) is unchanged. The economic dimension, however, 
has evolved. Countries that are primarily interested in China’s markets are contrasted with 
those that prioritize the opportunities offered by the inflow of Chinese investment and credits. 
The first country group—“Frustrated market-openers”—consists of Sweden, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, and the UK, with Germany and France as new allies. These countries, which had 
been “Ideological free-traders” before (Germany and France excepted), are still reluctant to 
use protectionist tools to pry open the Chinese market, but they now seem prepared to accept 
the use of the term reciprocity, as well as a resort to the threat of trade barriers in 
negotiations. (Despite its strategic partnership with China, Germany seems prepared to use 
the EU institutions to put pressure on China.) This more activist group is balanced by the 
southern European countries, which, together with Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, see China 
as a part of the solution to their financial problems. These countries make up the group “Cash-
strapped deal-seekers”. Their short-term interest lies not in selling to the Chinese market, but 
in attracting Chinese investors. The majority of member states in central and eastern Europe, 
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along with such countries as Ireland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, are found between these two 
groups. They hope to attract some inflows of Chinese capital, but they take a more critical 
attitude towards China than do the “Cash-strapped deal-seekers”.  
It is obvious the EU faces a major challenge in formulating a common China policy. The 
differences in national strategy vis-à-vis China are not just connected with political 
considerations; they also reflect fundamental differences in economic structure. Countries like 
Germany see opportunities in the Chinese market, and they have been successful in adapting 
to China’s global expansion. By moving away from industries in which China is more 
competitive and expanding in areas where Chinese demand is high (and where China’s 
technical skills have not caught up with Europe’s), Germany has managed to maintain exports 
as a key driver of its economy. Other countries, particularly in southern Europe, have been 
unable to adapt to China’s expansion, and so have been defeated by Chinese exporters in 
many of their traditional export industries.  
Figure 8.7 points to one of the fundamental reasons for these structural differences. 
Insufficient investment in R&D made it impossible for countries such as Greece, Portugal, 
Spain, and Italy to upgrade production or to build up new export industries when China began 
cutting into their market shares. The opposite was true for countries such as Germany and 
Sweden, where investment in R&D led to innovations that contributed to large current account 
surpluses some years later. This suggests the debt problems in the PIIGS countries were caused 
not only by excessive borrowing and undisciplined financial management, but also by 
insufficient adaptation to China’s global expansion. 
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Nor will these fundamental differences automatically disappear when the acute debt problems 
are resolved. It is likely, rather, that the contrast between southern and northern Europe will 
persist. It is even possible the asymmetries in macroeconomic flexibility and adaptability will 
increase, since much of the crisis management carried out in the most severely affected EU 
economies has taken the form of budget cuts and reduced public investment. Some of the 
budget cuts, it seems, are affecting precisely the areas which are central for enhancing future 
competitiveness and structural adaptability: R&D and higher education. As a result, much of 
the adjustment to increased foreign competition in these countries will have to take place 
through lower labour costs rather than higher labour productivity. 
 
Figure 8.7:  R&D expenditures in 2000 and current account balances in 2008, EU-15. 
 
  
Source: World Bank Databank. 
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The prospects for a unified European policy towards China are therefore not very good. The 
interests of individual member states towards China vary, and they vary too greatly for a 
reconciliation between them to be possible in the short term. If southern and eastern Europe 
are to be persuaded to join with western and northern Europe in a common approach to 
China, then far-reaching reforms in internal EU policy will likely be necessary. The Union will 
have to provide enough internally generated resources (subsidies and credits) to compensate 
for the expected loss of credits and investment from China. The probability of this happening 
in the current institutional environment is low. Granted, Chinese labour costs are expected to 
rise so rapidly as to induce some production to move back to Europe from China quite soon; 
however, the volume of returning investment is unlikely to be large enough to make any major 
difference. It may instead make more sense to place our hopes in closer cooperation with the 
United States, through the establishment of a transatlantic free trade and investment 
partnership. A TTIP is expected to create hundreds of thousands of new jobs in both Europe 
and North America, and to strengthen the negotiating position of both regions in their 
dialogue with China. 
However, whether a transatlantic agreement can be reached or not, it is clear that it lies in the 
common European interest that dependence on China not grow too great. The most realistic 
scenario for a European China policy is that the division of labour between the EU institutions 
and the individual member states remains in place. This entails a central role for the EU in 
demanding reciprocity and working for greater market access to China, in some cases with 
European trade policy as an instrument. The Union may also take on a stronger role than 
before in order to make sure Chinese investment in Europe does not distort or undermine 
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labour laws or tax laws in the single market. By delegating the critical and scrutinizing role to 
the EU institutions, member states with urgent needs and a weak bargaining position can 
avoid bilateral discussions in which they are forced to make far-reaching compromises on 
subsidies, labour regulations, the environment, and other areas that ought to be governed by 
common EU rules. How well such a multi-pronged strategy works will naturally depend on 
whether a more critical EU attitude is supported by the member countries. Germany’s attitude 
is particularly important, given both its economic weight and the fact that China has decided to 
invest specially in relations with it. 
5 A transatlantic partnership to balance China 
In this paper, I have discussed three imbalances that weigh on the relationship between the EU 
and China. The large deficit in Europe’s trade with China is the first. The EU is China’s biggest 
export destination, and in recent years China’s bilateral trade surplus with the EU has been 
almost as big as its surplus with the US. China’s global expansion has particularly created 
problems for EU countries which export relatively labour-intensive goods in mature industries, 
in direct competition with China. 
The second imbalance concerns conditions for European investment in China and Chinese 
investment in Europe. There is an asymmetry in terms of investment flows—EU investment in 
China is ten times larger than Chinese investment in the EU—but this imbalance has begun to 
diminish slowly, as Chinese companies internationalize. The imbalance which remains in this 
area is that between the business environment for foreign investors in the EU and that for 
foreign investors in China. While Chinese companies have essentially free access to the 
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European market, including the market for public procurement, foreign companies operating 
in the Chinese market face significant barriers. 
The third imbalance in the relationship between the EU and China stems from the EU’s 
inability to agree on a common stance vis-à-vis China. While China has a strong central 
government which can implement policies that maximize benefits for the nation as a whole, 
the EU is fragmented. It has no common China policy. Instead it has a relatively weak EU 
Commission, which is trying to pursue its policy goals at the same time that several member 
states are pursuing national strategies to achieve mainly domestic objectives, rather than the 
interests of the Union as a whole. 
I argued above that some of the imbalances in the trade area will gradually diminish. China’s 
wage levels are expected to rise rapidly in coming years, for demographic and structural 
reasons, and this will help gradually to eliminate China’s “unfair” competitiveness in 
international trade. However, many imbalances relating to investment conditions are unlikely 
to disappear in the near future. Remaining market access restrictions and discriminatory 
practices are likely to survive, especially in strategic sectors where China seeks to build up its 
future competitiveness. In the short term, the EU does not have the means to influence the 
Chinese business environment—particularly the special relationship between the state and 
state-owned enterprises. The Union’s fragmentation is one major reason for this. The 
countries that would like the Union to present a tougher policy front to China do not have the 
desire (or ability) to compensate those EU members that are afraid a tougher China policy will 
be costly in terms of foregone Chinese investment and credits. China, for its part, does not 
necessarily perceive the fragmentation of European interests as a disadvantage. It may find it 
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easier, namely, to reach its policy objectives if it can “divide and conquer”, by focusing on 
bilateral dealings with individual EU countries instead of negotiating with a unified and 
powerful EU Commission. 
Over the medium term, however, there may be cause for greater optimism about the EU’s 
ability to influence China, and to obtain better conditions for European investors in the 
Chinese market. The Union has two weaknesses in its current relationship with China. One is 
that a stagnant EU probably needs stimulus from its relationship with China to a greater extent 
than China needs anything from the EU. The second is that structural imbalances within the EU 
itself prevent it from achieving a strong negotiating position, because different countries 
within it have fundamentally different interests. Both of these deficiencies might, however, be 
mitigated by one and the same process. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) currently being prepared between the US and the EU can help make the European 
market more attractive to the outside world, and facilitate recovery in those parts of Europe 
that today see China as one of the few sources of investment and credits. A large transatlantic 
market will be so attractive as to enable the EU and the US to pressure China jointly for reform 
and reciprocity. It will also create an alternative to investment and financing from China, and 
facilitate the development of a common European China policy. Of course, a transatlantic 
partnership is attractive for Europe even without these advantages. When the indirect effects 
on relations between the EU and China (and the US and China) are included besides, it 
becomes well-nigh irresistible. 
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